From the Editor: Don't Take Encryption for Granted - Systems Management News On The Web

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AS OF 8/20/2008 9:08AM EST

From the Editor: Don't Take Encryption for Granted
By Systems Management News Team

June 15, 2008 — When the Debian team revealed in May that it had cryptography problems, many systems administrators found themselves regenerating and managing thousands of encryption keys. From a management standpoint, the biggest hassle was, likely, figuring out which keys were bad and where they all resided.

But for the end user, the whole debacle was likely ignored. When it comes to public key encryption, most end users have to have a VPN or keyed Web access set up for them. They don’t even know there’s encryption involved, let alone understand what an elliptic curve is.

These users are probably taking your security measures for granted. And, now that Internet encryption is an old and proven discipline, perhaps you’re taking your encryption for granted as well. Encryption can be a double-edged sword, however. If your system is locked down, and all your keys are 1024 bits or higher, it’s very likely that, if there’s a security breach, you’re not going to consider a successful brute force attack against those keys as your first culprit. Instead, it’s more likely that someone’s password has been stolen, a database has been compromised or a trojan has made its way onto a server.

Should security practitioners think this way? Probably not, but after years of solid and reliable encryption being available to anyone everywhere, it’s no wonder that crypto tends to be the last possible place people expect a failure. Blame vendors and open-source developers; it’s easy to spin the wheel and scramble things beyond recognition before sending them out into the wild.

And this is why the Debian failure has been such a massive nightmare: With the changing of just a few lines of code, millions of keys generated by thousands of users over the past two years have been completely vulnerable, and there’s been nary a clue. Even the best of cryptographers can’t tell if a bad random number generator was used just by looking at the key. And that’s the worst part about crypto vulnerabilities: They’re the sort of problem that can be hidden for years then pop up suddenly to reveal an entire infrastructure as vulnerable.

It’s unfortunate that the Debian team made this mistake, but perhaps, as a warning, it’s a good thing overall. We’d bet that no one who’s following this issue is going to take cryptography for granted anymore. As rightly they shouldn’t.

Related Search Term(s): Security, Debian

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